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VALUING INJUNCTIVE RELIEF UNDER THE 
CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT 
SADIE J. KAVALIER† 
ABSTRACT 
  Injunctive relief class actions afford victims of mass harms a chance 
to sue collectively and enjoin an actor’s conduct. While the moral value 
of these suits may be monumental for litigants, one procedural question 
remains murky: how should courts value the amount in controversy to 
determine whether the suit qualifies for federal diversity jurisdiction? 
  Historically, federal courts adopted one of two approaches. The 
“Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach” values the amount in controversy 
strictly from any monetary benefit to the plaintiff(s). The “Either 
Viewpoint approach” values the amount in controversy as the higher 
of any monetary benefit to the plaintiff or the cost to the defendant of 
implementing the injunction. Naturally, the more inclusive Either 
Viewpoint approach tends to result in successful removal more often 
than the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach. For defendants, removal to 
federal court can be an incredible asset to a class action litigation.  
  In 2005, the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”) effectively opened 
federal courts’ doors to a broader array of class action suits than federal 
diversity jurisdiction previously allowed. Despite this expansion, some 
federal district courts have continued to apply the more restrictive 
Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach even in cases removed under CAFA. 
This Note argues that CAFA’s text, legislative history, and underlying 
policy concerns require using the Either Viewpoint approach 
uniformly in CAFA class actions and suggests a congressional 
amendment to require this approach.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Litigants in the United States wield a unique procedural technique 
for bringing suit on behalf of hundreds, thousands, and even millions 
of plaintiffs: the class action.1 In injunctive relief class actions, injured 
plaintiffs can collectively sue to enjoin an actor’s conduct. For example, 
in Anderson v. SeaWorld Parks & Entertainment, Inc.,2 the plaintiffs 
sued on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated SeaWorld 
patrons harmed by the park’s “deceptive” assertion that it “cares for 
sea creatures, including Orcas.”3 The plaintiffs did not seek any 
monetary damages for the class.4 Instead, they demanded that 
SeaWorld publish information on its website about the negative effects 
of captivity on orca health.5 Even though plaintiffs did not seek 
monetary damages, SeaWorld contended that implementing these 
measures would cost over $5 million in lost ticket sales, retracted 
sponsorships, and tarnished reputation.6 In calculating the amount in 
controversy, a necessary condition to accessing federal diversity 
jurisdiction,7 should the court look to the plaintiffs’ negligible 
monetary benefit from the injunction or the massive losses an 
injunction would impose on SeaWorld?8 
 
 1. See Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985) (describing the class action as 
unique to United States jurisprudence as allowing “litigation of a suit involving common questions 
when there are too many plaintiffs for proper joinder”). 
 2. Anderson v. SeaWorld Parks & Ent., Inc., 132 F. Supp. 3d 1156 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
 3. Id. at 1159, 1167. 
 4. Id. at 1159. However, the named plaintiffs did seek monetary damages in their individual 
capacity. Id. 
 5. Id.  
 6. Id. at 1164; see also SeaWorld’s Opposition to Motion to Remand at 12–14, Anderson v. 
SeaWorld Parks & Ent., Inc., 132 F. Supp. 3d 1156 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (No. 3:15-CV-02172 SC) 
(arguing that implementing the proposed remedy on behalf of unnamed class members would 
cost SeaWorld an amount exceeding the $5 million threshold). 
 7. While there may be other routes to federal jurisdiction in class actions, this Note will 
focus on CAFA and general diversity jurisdiction. The vast majority of class actions involve 
questions of state tort or contract law, leaving few opportunities to remove for questions of federal 
law. See FED. JUD. CTR., IMPACT OF THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT ON THE FEDERAL 
COURTS 3 (2008), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/CAFA1108.pdf [https://perma.cc/
8Z3F-34BJ] (reporting that in cases removed under CAFA in its first three years, 65 percent were 
contract or consumer protection cases, 32 percent were torts cases, and 3 percent did not fall into 
either of those categories).  
 8. To qualify for federal jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, the 
amount in controversy must exceed $5 million. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). In cases like SeaWorld 
where the parties have drastically different monetary values attached to the outcome, this means 
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The distinction matters a great deal in class actions removed to 
federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”).9 
CAFA encapsulates Congress’s response to state courts’ “abuse” of 
the class action mechanism exhibited in bias against out-of-state 
defendants and disposition of national-scale class actions in an 
individual state’s court.10 Specifically, the Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary noted that pre-CAFA class action rules allowed attorneys to 
“game the system” by organizing a putative class to avoid federal 
jurisdiction.11 Plaintiffs (and perhaps more importantly, their 
attorneys) could thereby take advantage of state court judges known 
for certifying questionable classes and approving massive settlements.12 
This was perceived as “one of the most flagrant abuses” of the previous 
class action system, wherein attorneys could “invent an injured class 
and then file a national class action in a ‘magnet jurisdiction’ where the 
judges are more likely to lend a sympathetic ear.”13 Concern over state 
courts’ abuse of the class action mechanism figures prominently in 
CAFA’s text.14 
If state courts were the problem, federal courts were the answer. 
Writ large, CAFA embodies congressional intent to expand federal 
jurisdiction over class actions by eliminating major obstacles to 
removal.15 Namely, CAFA grants federal jurisdiction over class actions 
with over one hundred class members,16 with at least one class member 
 
that the method for valuing that amount in controversy can either permit or preclude federal 
jurisdiction. 
 9. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered 
sections of Title 28 of the U.S. Code). 
 10. Id. § 2(a)(4).  
 11. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 10 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 5.  
 12. Id. at 20–21. 
 13. 150 CONG. REC. 14,512 (2004) (statement of Sen. Christopher J. Dodd). 
 14. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered 
sections of Title 28 of the U.S. Code). The Act explicitly names “State and local courts” as abusers 
of the system by keeping national cases out of federal court, demonstrating bias against out-of-
state defendants, and wrongfully imposing their binding judgments upon residents of other states. 
Id. § 2(a)(4). 
 15. See Gregory P. Joseph, Federal Class Action Jurisdiction After CAFA, Exxon Mobil and 
Grable, 8 DEL. L. REV. 157, 158 (2006) (“The heart of CAFA is its expansion of federal diversity 
jurisdiction.”). Unsurprisingly, this change was not viewed as a universal good. CAFA’s 
opponents who favored plaintiffs disliked the expansion because federal judges were so much less 
likely than state court judges to certify a class. S. REP. NO. 108-123, at 75 (2003).  
 16. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(5)(B). 
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of diverse citizenship from any defendant,17 and an aggregated amount 
in controversy exceeding $5 million.18 This final provision signified a 
distinct departure from pre-CAFA amount-in-controversy 
requirements, which required at least one plaintiff to claim an amount 
exceeding $75,000.19 Furthermore, U.S. Supreme Court precedent had 
previously barred aggregation of plaintiffs’ claims to meet the amount 
in controversy in any class action.20 On one hand, CAFA’s claim 
aggregation expands federal jurisdiction over small claims class 
actions, which are classes having many members with such small claims 
that bringing suit individually would prove infeasible. Conversely, it 
creates a puzzling question of how courts should determine the 
aggregated amount in controversy in class actions demanding 
injunctive relief. 
Before CAFA, federal courts split on their techniques for valuing 
the amount in controversy in class actions seeking injunctive relief.21 
One group adopted the “Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach,” which 
measures the amount in controversy strictly by the monetary benefit 
the plaintiffs would receive from the injunction.22 The other group 
adopted the “Either Viewpoint approach.”23 The Either Viewpoint 
 
 17. Id. § 1332(d)(2)(A). This provision is subject to further provisions allowing for 
discretionary or mandatory remand to state court if over one-third of class members are citizens 
of the forum state. Id. § 1332(d)(3). Judicial discretion depends on whether the number of in-state 
class members exceeds two-thirds of the total class. Id. § 1332(d)(4).  
 18. Id. § 1332(d)(2). 
 19. See id. § 1332(a) (requiring amount in controversy of $75,000); see also Snyder v. Harris, 
394 U.S. 332, 338 (1969) (granting supplemental jurisdiction over class actions but requiring at 
least one class member to meet the $75,000 threshold). 
 20. Snyder, 394 U.S. at 338 (holding that Rule 23 does not permit class member plaintiffs to 
aggregate claims in meeting the amount-in-controversy threshold). 
 21. Technically, a third category values the injunctive relief from the viewpoint of the party 
invoking federal jurisdiction. Sarah S. Vance, A Primer on the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 
80 TUL. L. REV. 1617, 1628 (2006). However, this group remains relatively obsolete and has been 
largely absorbed into the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach. See McCarty v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 
595 F.2d 389, 392–93 (7th Cir. 1979) (considering the merits of applying the viewpoint of the party 
invoking federal jurisdiction).  
 22. See, e.g., Ericsson GE Mobile Commc’ns, Inc. v. Motorola Commc’ns & Elecs., Inc., 120 
F.3d 216, 219 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[W]e conclude that this court’s predecessor purposefully and 
conspicuously adopted the plaintiff-viewpoint rule.”); Mass. State Pharm. Ass’n v. Fed. 
Prescription Serv., Inc., 431 F.2d 130, 132 (8th Cir. 1970) (“The amount in controversy is tested 
by the value of the suit’s intended benefit to the plaintiff.”). 
 23. See, e.g., Ullman v. Safeway Ins. Co., 995 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1217 (D.N.M. 2013) (“The 
Tenth Circuit follows the ‘either viewpoint rule,’ which considers either the value to the plaintiff, 
or the cost to the defendant of injunctive and declaratory relief, as the measure of the amount in 
controversy.”). 
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approach measures the amount in controversy as the greater of the 
monetary benefit the plaintiffs would receive from the injunction or 
the cost to the defendant of implementing the injunction.24 District 
courts have consistently applied their pre-CAFA viewpoint precedent 
to injunctive relief cases under CAFA, despite CAFA’s distinct 
departure from prior class action rules.25  
A court’s choice of viewpoint matters quite a bit in a case like 
SeaWorld. There, the putative class met every other requirement under 
CAFA (i.e., the class had over one hundred members and at least one 
member was of diverse citizenship from SeaWorld).26 The plaintiffs 
filed in state court,27 then SeaWorld sought removal to federal court 
under CAFA.28 While the plaintiffs received no monetary benefit from 
the putative class’s demand that SeaWorld publish information about 
orcas in captivity,29 to SeaWorld the change “would more likely than 
not reduce future sales by at least 16.7% . . . [plus] the value of 
developing a new, viable marketing campaign.”30 Based on SeaWorld’s 
$160 million in ticket revenues over the previous four years, 
SeaWorld’s costs would far exceed $5 million.31 Now imagine 
compounding this substantial financial exposure with a hostile state 
court that is ready to certify a class and impose a costly injunction 
against SeaWorld.32 
Under the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach, SeaWorld could not 
remove to federal court. Traditional class action diversity jurisdiction 
requires at least one member of the class to meet the $75,000 amount-
in-controversy requirement,33 but CAFA bridged this gap by allowing 
aggregation of plaintiffs’ claims.34 However, SeaWorld still could not 
remove to federal court under the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach 
because there is no monetary benefit to the plaintiffs, and the court 
 
 24. Id. 
 25. Valdez v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 867 F. Supp. 2d 1143, 1164–65 (D.N.M. 2012); 
Hall v. Triad Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 07-cv-0184-MJR, 2007 WL 2948405, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 10, 
2007). 
 26. Anderson v. SeaWorld Parks & Ent., Inc., 132 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1163 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
 27. Id. at 1159. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 1163. 
 30. Id. at 1164 (emphasis omitted). 
 31. Id. at 1164–65.  
 32. See supra notes 10–13 and accompanying text.  
 33. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 558–59 (2005). 
 34. Joseph, supra note 15.  
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would not consider the cost to SeaWorld. SeaWorld would thus face a 
significant injunctive liability that may be further exacerbated by a 
state court hostile to its interests. 
The Either Viewpoint approach would allow SeaWorld to remove 
to federal court. Considering both the negligible benefit to the 
plaintiffs and the potential costs imposed on SeaWorld, the potential 
cost to the defendant exceeds the amount-in-controversy requirement 
of $5 million. This outcome aligns with Congress’s intent to expand 
federal jurisdiction over class actions and allows defendants to avoid 
state courts’ hostility.35 
However, Congress’s failure to specify the proper viewpoint for 
evaluating the amount in controversy in injunctive relief class actions 
has resulted in a muddled collection of district court opinions 
delivering unpredictable CAFA interpretations.36 Defendants 
removing injunctive relief CAFA cases to jurisdictions that have 
adopted the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach are unable to take full 
advantage of the broad federal jurisdiction CAFA confers. Although 
earlier scholarship acknowledges the discrepancy in federal courts’ 
application of these approaches,37 no author has defended a unified 
approach in CAFA cases. This Note argues that the Either Viewpoint 
approach best aligns with CAFA’s text, legislative history, and 
underlying policy concerns, and that the Either Viewpoint approach 
should be uniformly implemented by amending CAFA’s text.  
Part I summarizes jurisprudence valuing amounts in controversy 
in injunctive relief class actions prior to CAFA’s enactment, 
 
 35. In SeaWorld, the Court ultimately applied the Either Viewpoint approach and 
determined that the cost to SeaWorld exceeded $5 million and allowed its case to remain in 
federal court. SeaWorld, 132 F. Supp. 3d at 1164–65. 
 36. District courts within the same circuit have issued conflicting opinions on the proper 
Viewpoint in CAFA cases. See Campos v. Metabolic Rsch., Inc., No. CV 09-9445-VBF(DTBx),  
2010 WL 11597627, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2010) (“The ‘defendant’s-viewpoint approach’ cannot 
be used in class actions without undermining the rule that class action plaintiffs cannot aggregate 
the amounts of separate claims.”). But see Pagel v. Dairy Farmers of Am., Inc., 986 F. Supp. 2d 
1151, 1159 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (ruling that the circuit’s pre-CAFA precedent did not require “that 
the ‘either viewpoint’ rule is prohibited in CAFA cases”). For more in-depth discussion of district 
court decisions, see infra Part II.B.  
 37. See, e.g., Christopher A. Pinahs, Note, Diversity Jurisdiction and Injunctive Relief: Using 
a “Moving-Party Approach” To Value the Amount in Controversy, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1930, 1943 
(2011) (explaining that the lack of congressional intent or Supreme Court guidance caused the 
“lower courts [to] struggle to fashion a uniform valuation procedure.”); Steven M. Puiszis, 
Developing Trends with the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 115, 124–
26 (2006) (noting that while CAFA eliminated the anti-aggregation principle, “[n]ot all federal 
circuits follow the either viewpoint rule”).  
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demonstrating the problems Congress believed warranted changing 
the requirements for federal jurisdiction over class actions under 
CAFA. Part II explores CAFA’s provisions that expand federal 
jurisdiction to protect defendants in class actions. This Part illustrates 
the necessity of implementing the Either Viewpoint approach to 
ensure that defendants’ interests are fairly considered in small claims 
class actions as CAFA intended, comparing this to federal courts’ 
inconsistent interpretation of CAFA in injunctive relief cases. Part III 
demonstrates the Either Viewpoint approach’s consistency with 
CAFA’s text, legislative history, and underlying policy concerns and 
advocates for congressional amendment of CAFA to ensure that 
federal courts use the Either Viewpoint approach uniformly. 
I.  PRE-CAFA CLASS ACTIONS 
This Part explains class action precedent leading up to CAFA’s 
enactment, including the problems Congress perceived in pre-CAFA 
class actions’ frequent confinement to state court. Section A details 
Supreme Court precedent barring aggregation of plaintiffs’ claims and 
requiring complete diversity. Section B explores the consequences of 
state court jurisdiction pre-CAFA, namely, state courts’ hostility 
toward out-of-state defendants and the states’ effective creation of 
national policy through their disposition of national-scale class actions. 
A. Supreme Court Precedent on Claim Aggregation and Minimal 
Diversity 
Long before the class action entered the main stage in American 
jurisprudence, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed claim aggregation in 
the landmark case Oliver v. Alexander.38 In Oliver, the Court held that 
the calculation of each plaintiff’s amount in controversy “is confined 
solely to his own claim . . . without any reference to the claims of 
others.”39 This anti-aggregation precedent prevented plaintiffs from 
aggregating their claims leading up to the adoption of Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 23 in 1966.40 The Court then addressed putative class 
 
 38. Oliver v. Alexander, 31 U.S. 143 (1832). 
 39. Id. at 147.  
 40. Rule 23 provides the basis and prerequisites for bringing a suit as a class action in federal 
court by certifying a class of plaintiffs. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. For more on the Rule’s history and 
developments, see generally Deborah R. Hensler, Happy 50th Anniversary Rule 23! Shouldn’t We 
Know You Better By Now?, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1599 (2017).  
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members’ claim aggregation under Rule 23 in Snyder v. Harris.41 The 
Court intervened to determine whether “separate and distinct claims 
presented by and for various claimants in a class action may be added 
together to provide the $10,000 jurisdictional amount in controversy.”42 
The Court answered no, ruling that plaintiffs could not aggregate 
individual claims to satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement for 
diversity jurisdiction.43 
Twenty-one years later, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 provided that whenever 
a district court properly exercised original jurisdiction over an action, 
the court would have “supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims 
that are so related to claims in the action . . . that they form part of the 
same case or controversy.”44 In Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah 
Services, Inc.,45 the Supreme Court decided that § 1367’s supplemental 
jurisdiction grants federal jurisdiction over an entire class whenever a 
single class member met the amount in controversy,46 even over the 
members who did not themselves meet the amount in controversy.47 
Reasoning that § 1367(a)’s broad grant of jurisdiction applied 
whenever a district court had original jurisdiction, “[t]he natural, 
indeed the necessary, inference is that § 1367 confers supplemental 
jurisdiction over claims by . . . Rule 23 plaintiffs.”48 Although Congress 
enacted CAFA a few months before Allapattah, it did not apply 
retroactively and the Court explicitly refused to analyze CAFA’s 
potential impacts.49 
Even after Allapattah, significant impediments remained to 
securing removal. First, Allapattah held that federal courts could 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over class members only if the 
district court had original jurisdiction.50 Small claims class actions that 
did not have at least one member meeting the amount in controversy 
could not avail themselves of supplemental jurisdiction. Per the most 
 
 41. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969). 
 42. Id. at 333.  
 43. Id. at 336. 
 44. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). 
 45. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005). 
 46. Id. at 559. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 560.  
 49. Id. at 571–72. 
 50. Id. at 559. 
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recently amended federal amount-in-controversy requirement,51 
Allapattah effectively held that at least one class member must have a 
big enough stake in the suit to meet the $75,000 amount-in-controversy 
requirement to access federal court.  
The longstanding rules of complete diversity were still in play as 
well.52 Since 1806, the Supreme Court has required that every plaintiff 
be a citizen of a different state from every defendant to qualify for 
federal diversity jurisdiction.53 Within the class action context, this 
meant that if any member of the putative class shared state citizenship 
with the defendant, the class would be disqualified from federal 
diversity jurisdiction. In effect, this limitation precluded any chance of 
diversity jurisdiction when plaintiffs’ class definition included 
individuals from all fifty states.54  
To summarize, pre-CAFA, parties still had to demonstrate 
complete diversity in order to qualify for federal jurisdiction.55 
Additionally, class action plaintiffs could not aggregate their claims to 
satisfy the amount in controversy necessary for federal jurisdiction per 
Snyder.56 However, plaintiffs with smaller claims could still join a class 
action under § 1367 so long as one member met the amount-in-
controversy requirement.57 Functionally, this required at least one class 
member to have a stake greater than $75,000 in the suit.  
Let us apply this pre-CAFA precedent to SeaWorld. Even 
assuming that SeaWorld had complete diversity from every class 
member (a lofty assumption considering the class representatives and 
SeaWorld were both California citizens),58 the case would still not 
qualify for federal jurisdiction. The court found a negligible monetary 
benefit to the class from the injunction, meaning that no individual 
 
 51. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (requiring that the amount in controversy exceed the sum or value 
of $75,000).  
 52. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806). 
 53. Id. 
 54. See infra note 79, at 24 and accompanying text (explaining an Alabama case in which 20 
million class members from all fifty states filed in state court).  
 55. Strawbridge, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) at 267. 
 56. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 336 (1969). 
 57. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 559 
(2005). 
 58. Anderson v. SeaWorld Parks & Ent., Inc., 132 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1163 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
KAVALIER IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/16/2021  11:25 AM 
710  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 71:701 
class member had a claim exceeding the required $75,000 amount in 
controversy.59 Therefore, SeaWorld would be confined to state court. 
B. Pre-CAFA Class Actions in State Courts 
CAFA was predated by a decade-long effort by Congress to curb 
what it perceived as unfair state court class action judgments against 
defendants.60 As explored further below, Congress had two primary 
critiques of state courts’ management of class actions. First, it feared 
that state courts were hostile to out-of-state class action defendants and 
therefore rendered unfair judgments against them. Second, Congress 
emphasized the national, rather than local, scope of large class action 
suits, meaning they deserved consideration in a more neutral federal 
tribunal. 
CAFA’s legislative history is fraught with concern for state courts’ 
bias against out-of-state class action defendants.61 Advocates for 
CAFA’s unsuccessful predecessor bills highly regarded federal 
diversity jurisdiction’s protection for out-of-state defendants from 
hostile state courts.62 Legislators described the condition of states’ class 
action litigation in the early 2000s as “inconsistent with the 
constitutional theory of providing Federal diversity jurisdiction where 
there is the potential for discrimination against an out-of-state 
defendant.”63 Representatives discussed the financial burden of state 
courts’ treatment of defendants in class actions. Senator Orrin Hatch 
described how “sympathetic local juries trying out-of-state 
corporations bestow unjustified and sometimes outrageous awards.”64 
 
 59. See id. (finding that “Plaintiffs accrue no cognizable monetary benefit from this 
injunction”). 
 60. See Puiszis, supra note 37, at 115 (describing congressional acknowledgment of abusive 
class action claims within securities regulation starting in 1995).  
 61. CAFA’s legislative history primarily refers to non-federal courts oversimply as “state 
courts” rather than explicitly encompassing all local and municipal courts. In the Committee 
Report immediately following CAFA’s passage, the phrase “state court” appears 212 times, while 
any variation of the word “municipal” appears only twice, neither of which refers to municipal 
courts. See S. REP. NO. 109-14, 25, 83 n.4 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 22, 76 n.4 
(using “municipalities” and “municipal” only in describing case facts or in the proper name of an 
organization). Accordingly, this Note uses the nomenclature “state courts” to describe state, local, 
and municipal courts that fall outside of the federal court umbrella. 
 62. See S. REP. NO. 108-123, at 10 (2003) (“[A]n out-of-state defendant in a state court 
proceeding should have access to an even-handed federal forum.”). 
 63. H.R. REP. NO. 107-370, at 19 (2002). 
 64. 150 CONG. REC. 14,515 (2004) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch).  
KAVALIER IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/16/2021  11:25 AM 
2021] VALUING INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 711 
Legislators were also concerned with cases that never even reached the 
courtroom. They found that plaintiffs’ attorneys used “judicial 
blackmail” to threaten huge losses to defendants, which incentivized 
settlement even for frivolous claims.65 Congress viewed attorneys’ 
“ability to exercise unbounded leverage” over corporate defendants as 
an unfair burden in large-scale class actions.66 
Another concern stemmed from state courts’ allegedly lax 
procedures and willingness to certify class actions. One Senate Report 
noted that class actions filed within state courts increased by 1,000 
percent between 1988 and 1998.67 The Report cited studies 
demonstrating that certain counties were “hotbeds” for class actions 
with filings disproportionate to their respective populations.68 One 
such hotbed was Madison County, Wisconsin, where class action filings 
increased by 3,650 percent between 1998 and 2000.69 Arguing in favor 
of reform, the Report echoed concerns that “state court judges are less 
careful than their federal court counterparts when applying the 
procedural requirements that govern class actions.”70 
These claims of state court bias were met with resistance. 
Opposing legislators feared that federal judges were far less likely than 
state court judges to certify a class.71 Others declared that allegations 
of state court bias were “bereft of evidence.”72 Still, these arguments 
against CAFA failed to present any evidence that state courts were not 
biased against out-of-state defendants. Instead, CAFA’s opposition 
rested baldly on the claim that Supreme Court precedent already 
required due process for class action defendants.73  
Perhaps the more compelling argument for increasing federal 
jurisdiction over large class actions rested in their national scope. 
Legislators expressed concern that federal courts “cannot assert 
jurisdiction over claims encompassing large-scale, interstate class 
actions involving thousands of plaintiffs from multiple states . . . and 
hundreds of millions of dollars—cases that have obvious and significant 
 
 65. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 40 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 42. 
 66. Id. at 21. 
 67. S. REP. NO. 108-123, at 14 (2003). 
 68. Id.  
 69. Id.  
 70. Id. at 14–15.  
 71. Id. at 76. 
 72. Id. at 78.  
 73. Id. at 77–78, 127–28. 
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implications for the national economy.”74 Stated more bluntly by 
Senator Chuck Grassley, “[s]omething of national implication should 
not be decided in one Podunk county in one State but should be 
decided by our Federal courts.”75 This sentiment was raised repeatedly 
by CAFA advocates.76 One speaker at a Senate Judiciary Committee 
hearing noted that national class actions warranted federal jurisdiction, 
even if there were no abuses against defendants in state courts.77 
CAFA’s supporters argued that the national scope of some class 
actions warranted federal jurisdiction under the values of federalism.78 
The primary concern was state courts creating national policy: “[A] 
system that allows state court judges to dictate national policy on 
these . . . issues from the local courthouse steps is contrary to the intent 
of the Framers when they crafted our system of federalism.”79 One 
Senate Judiciary Committee Report highlighted a class action filed in 
an Alabama county court against General Motors Company.80 There, 
the plaintiffs claimed that class membership included over 20 million 
car owners across the nation hurt by the “faulty” design of federally 
regulated airbags.81 This suit begged the question: “Why should an 
Alabama state court tell 20 million people in all 50 states what kind of 
airbags they can have in their cars?”82  
But what if a class action in Alabama truly only involved Alabama 
citizens and questions of Alabama law? The above is not to say that 
legislators did not consider the benefits of keeping some class actions 
in state court. CAFA’s broad removal provisions are backstopped to 
prevent removing cases that are “truly local,” such as when enough 
plaintiffs are from the original filing state.83 Congress did not intend to 
 
 74. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 11 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 14. 
 75. 150 CONG. REC. 14,369 (2004) (statement of Sen. Charles Grassley). 
 76. See, e.g., 150 CONG. REC. 14,512 (2004) (statement of Sen. Christopher J. Dodd) 
(“[A]ttorneys bringing class actions can manage to avoid Federal court all together . . . even 
though the total amount at stake might exceed hundreds of millions of dollars and have true multi-
State national implications.”). 
 77. Class Action Litigation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 10 
(2002) (statement of Walter Dellinger).  
 78. S. REP. NO. 108-123, at 9 n.12. 
 79. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 24 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 24. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. See infra Part II.B for discussion of CAFA’s exceptions for removal in cases where 
enough plaintiffs are from the state court. 
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strip state courts of all of their jurisdiction over class actions; rather, 
Congress merely granted federal jurisdiction over cases with national 
implications, leaving the remainder in state court.84 Senators who 
opposed the bill in its earliest forms later approved CAFA once the 
amount in controversy was raised to include only more nationally 
oriented suits, the idea being that only cases of significant magnitude 
warranted federal over state jurisdiction.85 
Both the state court bias and national importance rationales made 
it into CAFA’s text.86 In injunctive relief class actions, these arguments 
are particularly relevant to ascertaining the protection Congress sought 
to offer defendants by expanding federal court jurisdiction. CAFA 
specifically envisioned increasing defendants’ opportunity to remove 
to federal court by applying an inclusive framework. This type of 
framework requires valuing injunctive relief class actions under the 
Either Viewpoint approach. 
II.  CAFA EXPANDS FEDERAL JURISDICTION: CONSEQUENCES AND 
INTERPRETATIONS 
CAFA turned traditional federal diversity jurisdiction on its head 
for certain class action suits. As explained in this Part, CAFA expands 
jurisdiction over class actions by eliminating the complete diversity 
requirement and allowing plaintiffs’ claims to be aggregated to reach 
the amount in controversy. Section A reviews these provisions and 
explains their significant departure from previous requirements. 
Section B analyzes federal courts’ interpretations of CAFA for class 
actions seeking injunctive relief, demonstrating how courts have 
continued applying their pre-CAFA precedent in the face of significant 
evidence that CAFA is a distinct departure from prior class action 
precedent. Section C addresses how claim aggregation affects small 
 
 84. 150 CONG. REC. 14,515 (2004) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (“Our concern is to 
remove truly national actions to Federal court and not local controversies . . . .”).  
 85. For example, in supporting the amended bill, Senator Dianne Feinstein remarked: 
The amended Class Action Fairness Act . . . allow[s] Federal courts to hear national 
class action lawsuits . . . which involve more than 5 million in claims. I think the original 
bill was 2 million. We amended it in committee to make it even bigger so we could be 
sure as to the kinds of cases that would be affected. 
150 CONG. REC. 14,523–24 (2004) (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein). 
 86. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(a)(4), 119 Stat. 4 (“Abuses 
in class actions undermine the national judicial system . . . in that State and local courts 
are . . . keeping cases of national importance out of Federal court [and] sometimes acting in ways 
that demonstrate bias against out-of-State defendants . . . .”). 
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claims class actions and why these suits specifically support the Either 
Viewpoint approach.  
A. CAFA’s Minimal Diversity and Claim Aggregation Provisions 
CAFA’s purpose is to “provid[e] for Federal court consideration 
of interstate cases of national importance under diversity 
jurisdiction.”87 CAFA primarily expands federal jurisdiction through 
two mechanisms: minimal diversity and claim aggregation.  
Requiring only minimal diversity departed from the traditional 
complete diversity requirement established in Strawbridge v. Curtiss.88 
To access federal jurisdiction, every plaintiff had to be of diverse 
citizenship from every defendant.89 This doctrine became particularly 
cumbersome for class actions, whose membership could span all fifty 
states and thereby preclude diversity jurisdiction.90 In response, CAFA 
provides that federal courts shall have jurisdiction where “any member 
of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any 
defendant.”91  
CAFA’s permissive claim aggregation also constitutes a 
significant departure from prior class action precedent—in fact, it flies 
directly in the face of Snyder’s anti-aggregation doctrine. Still, 
Congress was explicit in its command: “In any class action, the claims 
of the individual class members shall be aggregated to determine 
whether the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of 
$5,000,000.”92 The Supreme Court acknowledged this departure in 
Allapattah, writing in its brief section on CAFA that “[i]t abrogates the 
rule against aggregating claims.”93 
Claim aggregation essentially opens the federal courts’ doors to 
small claims class actions in which a multitude of plaintiffs have de 
 
 87. Id. § 2(b)(2). 
 88. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).  
 89. Id.; see also Danks v. Gordon, 272 F. 821, 824 (2d Cir. 1921) (“A controversy is not 
between citizens of different states so as to give jurisdiction to the federal courts unless all the 
persons on one side of it are citizens of different states from all the persons on the other side.”). 
 90. See supra notes 80–82 and accompanying text for one such example of a national class 
action confined to state court. 
 91. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A) (emphasis added). 
 92. Id. § 1332(d)(6) (emphasis added). 
 93. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 571 (2005). 
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minimis claims against the same defendant.94 Instead of requiring that 
at least one plaintiff’s claim exceed $75,000, CAFA allows plaintiffs to 
aggregate their de minimis claims to meet the amount in controversy.95 
Make no mistake—while claim aggregation opens up federal 
jurisdiction previously unavailable to small claims class action 
plaintiffs, it also benefits defendants. Rather than being limited to state 
court, defendants retain the option to remove to federal court if the 
class’s aggregated claims exceed $5 million.96  
In juxtaposition to these broad jurisdiction-granting provisions, 
Congress also included a backstop in CAFA to keep truly local cases 
within state courts. Federal district courts exercise discretion in 
declining federal jurisdiction over cases where one- to two-thirds of 
class members and the primary defendants are citizens of the state 
where the suit was filed.97 Furthermore, federal district courts are 
required to decline jurisdiction in cases where at least two-thirds of the 
putative class members and the primary defendants are all citizens of 
the state where the suit was filed.98 This reflects congressional intent to 
only “remove truly national actions to Federal court and not local 
controversies.”99 Apart from these uniquely “local controversies,” 
minimal diversity is effectively defendant-friendly. Instead of limiting 
a defendant to state court whenever a class member shares its state 
citizenship, CAFA leaves the door open to federal jurisdiction so long 
as the defendant has diverse citizenship from at least one class member.  
CAFA’s provisions undoubtedly expand federal jurisdiction in 
theory by requiring only minimal diversity100 and permitting claim 
 
 94. “De minimis” or “small claims” class actions are the stereotypical justifications for the 
class action mechanism, because they allow plaintiffs with claims too small, logistically and 
practically, to sue to band together to recover from a defendant. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. 
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (“The policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is 
to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to 
bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights.” (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 
338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997))).  
 95. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(6). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. § 1332(d)(3). In exercising its discretion, the district court is instructed to consider the 
factors listed in § 1332(d)(3)(A)–(F). These considerations include the national scope of the 
interests at issue and the defendant’s connection with the forum. Id. § 1332(d)(3)(A)–(F). 
 98. Id. § 1332(d)(4)(B).  
 99. 150 CONG. REC. 14,515 (2004) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch). 
 100. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A) (granting original jurisdiction in class actions meeting the 
amount in controversy when “any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different 
from any defendant”). 
KAVALIER IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/16/2021  11:25 AM 
716  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 71:701 
aggregation.101 These expectations were reflected in reality: a study of 
three federal district courts in the four months following CAFA’s 
enactment showed a significant increase in class action filings.102 
Despite this clear intent and practical effect to expand federal 
jurisdiction, some defendants remain unable to access federal diversity 
jurisdiction because of federal courts’ continued use of the Plaintiff’s 
Viewpoint approach.  
B. CAFA in Action: Federal Courts’ Interpretations in Injunctive 
Relief Cases 
Even before CAFA, federal courts split over the question of 
injunctive relief valuation. One set—courts using the Plaintiff’s 
Viewpoint approach—maintains that only the value of the suit’s 
benefit to plaintiffs should be considered. The other set—courts using 
the Either Viewpoint approach—contends that the value of the suit’s 
benefit to plaintiffs or the cost to the defendant of implementing that 
benefit should be considered.103 
The Second, Third, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits 
follow the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach.104 These circuits narrowly 
define the “object of the litigation” as the potential value of relief to 
the plaintiff.105 These circuits have carried the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint 
approach into the class action sphere.106 They cite Snyder as barring the 
 
 101. Id. § 1332(d)(6). 
 102. Memorandum from Tom Willging & Emery Lee, Fed. Jud. Ctr. Rsch. Div., to the 
Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules 3 (May 22, 2006), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/
CAFA0506.pdf [https://perma.cc/UCN9-ACJ7]. Naturally, this increase puts a strain on federal 
courts’ dockets. Many federal judges have been hostile to CAFA removals, which some academics 
believe stems from their opposition to lengthy class action proceedings in their courtrooms. See 
infra Part III.B. 
 103. While technically some district courts have applied a third test, which values the amount 
in controversy based on the value to the party invoking jurisdiction, no federal circuit court has 
adopted this approach. Brittain Shaw McInnis, The $75,000.01 Question: What Is the Value of 
Injunctive Relief?, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1013, 1020–23, 1021 n.52 (1998). Therefore, this Note 
only considers the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint and Either Viewpoint approaches.  
 104. Id. at 1021–22, 1021 n.52, 1022 n.53.  
 105. McInnis, supra note 103, at 1022.  
 106. E.g., DiTolla v. Doral Dental IPA of N.Y., LLC, 469 F.3d 271, 276 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(“Generally . . . the amount in controversy is calculated from the plaintiff’s standpoint . . . .” 
(quoting Kheel v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 457 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1972))); Morrison v. Allstate Indem. 
Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1268 (11th Cir. 2000) (“For amount in controversy purposes, the value of 
injunctive or declaratory relief is the ‘value of the object of litigation’ measured from the 
plaintiff’s perspective.” (quoting Ericsson GE Mobile Commc’ns, Inc. v. Motorola Commc’ns & 
Elecs., Inc., 120 F.3d 216, 218–20 (11th Cir. 1997))); see Packard v. Provident Nat’l Bank, 994 F.2d 
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Either Viewpoint approach because it would impermissibly aggregate 
plaintiffs’ claims against a defendant.107 In the era of anti-aggregation 
and complete diversity, this functionally meant that at least one 
plaintiff had to claim a remedy valuated above $75,000.108  
The First, Fourth, Seventh, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits follow the 
Either Viewpoint approach in valuing the amount in controversy for 
claims demanding injunctive relief.109 These circuits define the “object 
of the litigation” more broadly as the potential value of relief to the 
plaintiff or the defendant’s cost of implementing that relief.110 These 
circuits also adopted this approach to injunctive relief class action.111 
While non-CAFA class actions do not share all of the rationales behind 
the Either Viewpoint approach, this Viewpoint still appears correct in 
these cases because of state courts’ bias against out-of-state defendants 
and the national scope of large class actions.112 If federal courts offer a 
safe haven to defendants fearing bias from state courts, it logically 
follows that this jurisdiction should especially be granted broadly when 
a defendant is faced with owing a sizeable judgment to many plaintiffs. 
Additionally, if the defendant’s costs are sufficiently high, then the case 
should be sufficiently national in scope to warrant federal jurisdiction. 
Regardless, the existing circuit split serves as a backdrop to the 
continued split in CAFA cases. 
CAFA’s framework applies only to a limited number of class 
actions meeting its specific requirements. CAFA grants federal 
jurisdiction over class actions having over one hundred class 
members,113 at least one class member of diverse citizenship from any 
defendant,114 and an aggregated amount in controversy exceeding $5 
 
1039, 1050 (3d. Cir. 1993) (declining to measure the amount in controversy by the costs to the 
defendants).  
 107. See, e.g., Packard, 994 F.2d at 1050 (“In a diversity-based class action seeking primarily 
money damages, allowing the amount in controversy to be measured by the defendant’s cost 
would eviscerate Snyder’s holding . . . . We will not permit plaintiffs to do indirectly that which 
they cannot do directly.”). 
 108. See supra Part I.A for an in-depth explanation of pre-CAFA class action amount-in-
controversy jurisprudence.  
 109. McInnis, supra note 103, at 1022 n.55. 
 110. Id. at 1022.  
 111. E.g., Comm. for GI Rts. v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466, 472–73 (D.C. Cir. 1975).  
 112. See supra Part I.B.  
 113. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(5)(B). 
 114. Id. § 1332(d)(2)(A). 
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million.115 In these few cases, district courts have fairly consistently 
followed their circuit’s pre-CAFA viewpoint precedent.116 For 
example, a string of district courts in the Tenth Circuit applied the 
Either Viewpoint approach to CAFA suits, each using the same 
language citing the Circuit’s existing precedent.117 In the Seventh 
Circuit, a district court applying the Either Viewpoint approach 
reasoned, “In class actions, the Seventh Circuit has determined [the 
amount in controversy] ‘by looking separately at each named plaintiff’s 
claim and the cost to the defendant of complying with an injunction 
directed to that plaintiff.’”118 Other circuits that have used the Either 
Viewpoint approach have not yet addressed the issue in CAFA cases.119 
District courts in circuits that had used the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint 
approach have reached varying results on valuations under CAFA. 
The discrepancy within the Eighth and Ninth Circuits is particularly 
notable. For example, one district court recently opined that “Eighth 
Circuit case law was well settled on the viewpoint issue when CAFA 
was passed . . . . Thus, in line with longstanding Eighth Circuit 
 
 115. Id. § 1332(d)(2). 
 116. See, e.g., Parker v. Riggio, No. 10 Civ. 9504(LLS), 2012 WL 3240837, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 6, 2012) (“[T]he prevailing method of calculating value in this Circuit is the ‘plaintiff’s 
viewpoint’ approach, where one calculates the value to the plaintiff, not the cost to the 
defendant.” (quoting Dimich v. Med-Pro, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 2d 517, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2004))). 
 117. See, e.g., Bailey v. Markham, No. CIV 19-0519 JB\GBW, 2020 WL 1324477, at *14 
(D.N.M. Mar. 20, 2020) (“The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit follows the 
‘either viewpoint rule,’ which considers either the value to the plaintiff, or the cost to the 
defendant of injunctive and declaratory relief, as the measure of the amount in controversy.”); 
Ullman v. Safeway Ins. Co., 995 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1217 (D.N.M. 2013) (“The Tenth Circuit follows 
the ‘either viewpoint rule,’ which considers either the value to the plaintiff, or the cost to the 
defendant of injunctive and declaratory relief, as the measure of the amount in controversy.”); 
Valdez v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 867 F. Supp. 2d 1143, 1163–64 (D.N.M. 2012) (“The Tenth 
Circuit follows the ‘either viewpoint rule,’ which considers either the value to the plaintiff, or the 
cost to the defendant of injunctive and declaratory relief, as the measure of the amount in 
controversy.”). 
 118. Hall v. Triad Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 07-cv-0184-MJR, 2007 WL 2948405, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 
10, 2007) (quoting Uhl v. Thoroughbred Tech. & Telecomms., Inc., 309 F.3d 978, 983 (7th Cir. 
2002)). 
 119. CAFA injunctive relief valuation has not been substantively addressed in the First, 
Fourth, or D.C. Circuits. A Westlaw search, WESTLAW (advanced search for: “class action 
fairness act” AND “either viewpoint” AND “amount in controversy” AND injunct!), returned 
no search results interpreting CAFA’s valuation of injunctive relief for district courts from the 
First, Fourth, or D.C. Circuits. Additionally, Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice and Procedure 
does not list any First, Fourth, or D.C. Circuit cases valuing the amount in controversy in 
injunctive relief under CAFA as of October 2020. 14AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR 
R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3703, at n.25 (4th ed. 2021).  
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tradition, the Court will apply the plaintiff’s-viewpoint test.”120 
Similarly, a district court in the Ninth Circuit held that the Either 
Viewpoint approach cannot be applied to CAFA cases because the 
circuit’s pre-CAFA precedent used the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint 
approach.121 
However, a different district court in the Eighth Circuit held that 
the cost to the defendant of an injunction could be considered in 
calculating the amount in controversy under CAFA.122 District courts 
in the Ninth Circuit appear similarly conflicted. SeaWorld represented 
one of these controversies. In SeaWorld, the court ultimately applied 
the Either Viewpoint approach, holding that “the value of the 
injunction-only case may be measured by the value of the injunction to 
the Defendant.”123 The court found that although the putative class’s 
benefit would be negligible, the cost to SeaWorld of complying with 
plaintiffs’ demanded relief sufficiently satisfied the amount in 
controversy to allow for federal jurisdiction under CAFA.124 
District court confusion on the proper viewpoint in CAFA cases 
is not limited to these two circuits. District courts in the Fifth and 
Eleventh Circuits have departed from their appellate precedent 
entirely, opting instead to apply the Either Viewpoint approach to 
CAFA class actions.125 Conversely, a district court in the Sixth Circuit 
 
 120. Waters v. Ferrara Candy Co., No. 17-cv-00197-NCC, 2017 WL 2618271, at *6 (E.D. Mo. 
June 16, 2017), aff’d, 873 F.3d 633 (8th Cir. 2017). Although the court did aggregate the plaintiff’s 
claims as required by CAFA, it decided that the suit did not warrant CAFA federal diversity 
jurisdiction because the defendants did not demonstrate that the value to the plaintiffs was more 
than nominal. Id. 
 121. See, e.g., Campos v. Metabolic Rsch., Inc., No. CV 09-9445-VBF(DTBx), 2010 WL 
11597627, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2010) (“The ‘defendant’s-viewpoint approach’ cannot be used 
in class actions without undermining the rule that class action plaintiffs cannot aggregate the 
amounts of separate claims.”). 
 122. Adams v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 981 F. Supp. 2d 837, 848–49 (S.D. Iowa 2013).  
 123. Anderson v. SeaWorld Parks & Ent., Inc., 132 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1162 (N.D. Cal. 2015); 
see also Pagel v. Dairy Farmers of Am., Inc., 986 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1159 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (ruling 
that the circuit’s pre-CAFA precedent did not require “that the ‘either viewpoint’ rule is 
prohibited in CAFA cases”). 
 124. SeaWorld, 132 F. Supp. at 1163–65. 
 125. See Bernstein v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., No. 09-80533-CIV-RYSKAMP/VITUNAC, 
2009 WL 10699864, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 4, 2009) (“Under CAFA, courts are also able to 
determine the amount in controversy by looking at defendant’s potential losses, including those 
sustained from an injunction.”); Thompson v. La. Reg’l Landfill Co., 365 F. Supp. 3d 725, 730 
(E.D. La. 2019) (“The legislative history of CAFA makes clear that the amount-controversy 
requirement is satisfied ‘if the value of the matter in litigation exceeds $5,000,000 either from the 
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that had not previously stated its preferred viewpoint decided in a 
CAFA case that it should “determine the amount in controversy from 
the perspective of the Plaintiffs.”126 
Few federal courts of appeals have had occasion to address 
CAFA, much less in the context of injunctive relief. The courts that 
have addressed CAFA injunctive relief more substantively declined to 
decide on a viewpoint based on case-bound facts.127 The Second Circuit 
came the closest to a resolution in DiTolla v. Doral Dental IPA of New 
York, LLC.128 There, the court merely alluded to a method of 
interpretation rather than adopting one of the viewpoints. A quote in 
dicta vaguely demonstrates preferring the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint 
approach: “Generally . . . the amount in controversy is calculated from 
the plaintiff’s standpoint; the value of the suit’s intended benefit or the 
value of the right being protected or the injury being averted 
constitutes the amount in controversy when damages are not 
requested.”129 Still, this passage only decided whether the plaintiff had 
alleged claimable damages, not whether this approach should be 
generally applied in CAFA cases.130 
Confused? Based on the hodgepodge of precedent listed above, 
you are in good company. These confusing interpretations are 
compounded by the national scope of CAFA class actions—depending 
on where the initial suit is filed, defendants could be subject to 
unpredictable CAFA applications. If the court decides to apply the 
Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach, defendants may be needlessly denied a 
federal forum when they might have been granted removal in a 
 
viewpoint of the plaintiff or the viewpoint of the defendant, and regardless of the type of relief 
sought.’” (quoting S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 42 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 40)).  
 126. Houchens v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., No. 13-CV-00214-CRS, 2013 WL 5740131, at *3 
(W.D. Ky. Oct. 22, 2013), rev’d, NO. 2014-CA-002017-MR, 2016 WL 4709168 (Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 
9, 2016), aff’d on other grounds, 569 S.W.3d 923 (Ky. 2018).  
 127. See Waters v. Ferrara Candy Co., 873 F.3d 633, 636 (8th Cir. 2017) (“We need not resolve 
the issue of whether courts should apply the plaintiffs’ viewpoint rule or the either viewpoint rule 
when determining the amount in controversy under CAFA because [defendant] did not meet its 
burden under either rule.”); Everett v. Verizon Wireless, Inc., 460 F.3d 818, 829 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(“[W]e need not resolve the question today. Even if we were to apply the ‘either viewpoint’ 
approach, the more generous of the two from defendant’s perspective, [defendant] has not 
satisfied a precondition for invoking the theory here.”). 
 128. DiTolla v. Doral Dental IPA of N.Y., LLC, 469 F.3d 271 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 129. Id. at 276–77 (alteration in original) (quoting Kheel v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 457 F.2d 46, 
49 (2d Cir. 1972)).  
 130. See id. (determining that the plaintiff “failed to demonstrate that the claim . . . satisfies 
CAFA’s jurisdictional amount in controversy”).  
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neighboring jurisdiction. These disjointed opinions confound CAFA’s 
ultimate purpose of providing out-of-state defendants with an “even-
handed federal forum” to resolve disputes.131 
C. CAFA’s Claim Aggregation Promotes the Social Value of Small 
Claims Class Actions under the Either Viewpoint Approach 
CAFA’s claim aggregation changed the landscape for one variety 
of class actions in particular: small claims class actions. These are class 
actions in which plaintiffs’ individual claims would be too small to 
pursue costly litigation, but in aggregate, there is enough value to bring 
suit on behalf of all injured plaintiffs.132 Within the context of these 
suits, however, attorneys are incentivized to engage in entrepreneurial 
litigation that is driven by the desire to recover fees from massive 
settlements or judgments that inadequately represent plaintiffs’ 
interests.133 Congress recognized that these abuses were occurring 
primarily in state courts and that defendants were bearing the burden 
of attorneys’ entrepreneurial litigation by paying out massive 
settlements and judgments rendered by state courts.134 CAFA’s claim 
aggregation provision implies the Either Viewpoint approach because 
it considers defendants’ stake in the litigation in deciding whether to 
grant federal jurisdiction. This sentiment rings particularly true for 
injunctive relief small claims class actions because the approach 
balances the interests of plaintiffs in aggregating their small claims 
against defendants’ interest in not being overly penalized.  
CAFA’s claim aggregation encourages small claims class actions 
in federal court by allowing plaintiffs to aggregate their individually 
 
 131. S. REP. NO. 108-123, at 10 (2003).  
 132. Then-Associate Justice Williams Rehnquist summarized the premise concisely: “Class 
actions . . . may permit the plaintiffs to pool claims which would be uneconomical to litigate 
individually.” Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985).  
 133. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and 
Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 882–83 (1987). Coffee offers three 
main issues that plague small claims class actions: (1) “High agency costs characterize class action 
litigation and permit opportunistic behavior by attorneys,” (2) “Class actions necessarily involve 
asymmetric stakes,” and (3) “An initial cost differential tends to favor plaintiffs in many forms of 
class action litigation.” Id.  
 134. See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 4 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 5 (“One key 
reason for these problems is that most class actions are currently adjudicated in state 
courts . . . where there is often inadequate supervision over litigation procedures and proposed 
settlements.”). 
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small claims.135 The societal benefit of small claims class actions has 
long been recognized in courts.136 The literature presents two theories 
explaining the societal benefit of small claims class actions: 
compensationalism and optimal deterrence. Compensationalism 
focuses on balancing the negative costs of entrepreneurial litigation 
with the benefit of allowing plaintiffs to aggregate their otherwise 
infeasible legal claims.137 Optimal deterrence theory is most relevant in 
the context of CAFA injunctive relief cases because it emphasizes 
imposing the maximal amount of penalty on defendants without over 
penalizing them.138 As illustrated above, one of Congress’s primary 
concerns in passing CAFA was state courts’ imposition of exorbitant 
judgments.139 Under the optimal deterrence approach, CAFA’s claim 
aggregation provision necessitates using the Either Viewpoint 
approach to avoid over penalizing defendants.  
1. Aggregation of Small Claims and the Optimal Deterrence 
Theory.  The optimal deterrence approach focuses on the optimal 
deterrence of the defendant, the primary party CAFA sought to 
protect. Preeminent optimal deterrence scholars Gary Friedman and 
Professor Myriam Gilles propose that in determining whether small 
claims class actions benefit society, “[a]ll that matters is whether the 
practice causes the defendant-wrongdoer to internalize the social costs 
 
 135. This Note focuses on the value of small claims class actions due to CAFA’s permissive 
aggregation of claims. Specifically, CAFA permits jurisdiction over all plaintiffs if their 
aggregated claim exceeds $5 million. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). Thus, small claims class actions differ 
most significantly under CAFA than other forms of diversity jurisdiction because no single 
plaintiff has to meet the amount-in-controversy threshold. See supra Part I.A.  
 136. See, e.g., Shutts, 472 U.S. at 809 (“Class actions also may permit the plaintiffs to pool 
claims which would be uneconomical to litigate individually. For example, this lawsuit involves 
claims averaging about $100 per plaintiff; most of the plaintiffs would have no realistic day in 
court if a class action were not available.”); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299 
(7th Cir. 1995) (“In most class actions—and those the ones in which the rationale for the 
procedure is most compelling—individual suits are infeasible because the claim of each class 
member is tiny relative to the expense of litigation.”). 
 137. Coffee, supra note 133, at 886–88. 
 138. Infra note 140. 
 139. See supra notes 10–14 and accompanying text. 
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of its actions.”140 Gilles and Friedman focus primarily on how 
underdeterrence can incentivize firms to continue harmful practices.141 
Analyzing the social utility of class actions through a CAFA lens 
naturally requires the perspective that granting broader federal 
jurisdiction purports to protect defendants rather than punish them.142 
However, the optimal deterrence framework is consistent with 
CAFA’s aims because it considers plaintiffs’ interest in sufficiently 
deterring defendants’ wrongful conduct, while also acknowledging that 
overly punitive judgments against these defendants are socially 
detrimental.143 This theory depends on finding the socially optimal 
level of deterrence by encouraging class actions that deter undesirable 
conduct while avoiding over deterring defendants through unfair state 
court decisions. In Gilles and Friedman’s words, “to deter optimally is 
not to deter maximally.”144 A socially optimal class action framework 
therefore promotes deterrence only insofar as it disincentivizes 
defendants from harming plaintiffs. 
2. The Either Viewpoint Approach Best Balances Parties’ Interests 
in CAFA Injunctive Relief Small Claims Class Actions under Optimal 
Deterrence.  CAFA’s claim aggregation effectively opens the door to 
federal jurisdiction for small claims class actions. While the $5 million 
amount-in-controversy requirement guarantees that only larger cases 
will be removable to federal court, CAFA’s claim aggregation 
provision still enables plaintiffs with small claims to threaten massive 
judgments on defendants. However, this value must be balanced with 
 
 140. Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth: The 
Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 105 (2006). While Gilles and 
Friedman do not attribute any value to plaintiffs being compensated for defendants’ wrongs, id. 
at 107, compensationalism places plaintiffs’ recovery at the center, Coffee, supra note 133, at 886–
88.  
 141. See Gilles & Friedman, supra note 140, at 160–61 (“[P]laintiffs may sue for injunctive 
relief and damages and then collude with the defendant to settle the case for damages 
only . . . . [D]efendants will pay dearly for this privilege because the injunction is what concerns 
them most (since it will end their ability to continue the lucrative but unlawful practice).”). 
 142. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 14 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 14 (“[S]tate court 
judges are lax about following the strict requirements of Rule 23 . . . , which are intended to 
protect the due process rights of . . . defendants. In contrast, federal courts generally scrutinize 
proposed settlements much more carefully and pay closer attention to the procedural 
requirements . . . .”). 
 143. See Gilles & Friedman, supra note 140, at 157 (indicating that a corporate wrongdoer 
should not “internalize more than 100% of the social costs of its actions”).  
 144. Id. at 155. 
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the interests of the defendants; courts must still be cautious to avoid 
over deterring defendants through exorbitant judgments. CAFA’s 
history and grant of broad federal jurisdiction over these cases imply 
that federal courts are best positioned to balance interests and avoid 
over penalizing defendants.145 Effectively, CAFA implies that allowing 
actions to proceed against defendants in state court constitutes over 
deterring defendants.146 
This reasoning applies to SeaWorld. Although plaintiffs’ claims 
against SeaWorld are relatively small, together they form a significant 
enough threat to the park such that SeaWorld would be motivated to 
make its practices safer for Orcas. Without this threat, SeaWorld might 
be underdeterred and fail to improve its practices. Conversely, over 
deterring SeaWorld by imposing exorbitantly expensive injunctions in 
state court may negatively impact consumers and stockholders.147 
Optimal deterrence lies somewhere in between these extremes. CAFA 
envisions a federal forum as best suited to weigh these interests, so it 
guarantees federal jurisdiction to defendants in certain cases such that 
they avoid facing an overly punitive judgment from a state court. 
However, if the value of the injunctive relief sought is viewed only from 
the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach, SeaWorld would be denied this 
avenue to federal jurisdiction.  
CAFA balances the interests of plaintiffs and defendants in 
optimal deterrence through its twofold grant of jurisdiction: plaintiffs 
can aggregate claims to meet the amount in controversy, but 
defendants can pursue the protection of federal court. If a district court 
can refuse defendants’ removal by valuing the amount in controversy 
from the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach, however, defendants remain 
 
 145. See supra Part I.B.  
 146. This assertion presupposes that state courts are in fact biased against out-of-state 
defendants, and therefore that judgments in state courts against class action defendants will be 
overly punitive. While this Note supports that conclusion, some scholars argue that such bias is a 
myth. See supra Part I.B for a more in-depth analysis of these competing arguments relating to 
CAFA’s legislative history.  
 147. Notably, this characterization of optimal deterrence does imply some necessary penalty 
to defendants who have incurred harm. If SeaWorld were found to have inflicted some harm on 
plaintiffs, some monetary penalty would be necessary under the theory to deter them from 
inflicting further harm. Accordingly, this Note does not argue against any penalization of 
defendants; rather, it argues that penalties must not be so large as to over deter. CAFA’s 
legislative history indicates that this overdeterrence has a net negative impact on consumers by 
depressing interstate commerce. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 29–30 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 29 (“[T]he Committee believes that such abuses hurt consumers by resulting in 
higher prices and less innovation, and that they undermine the principles of diversity jurisdiction, 
which were established by the Framers to promote interstate commerce.”). 
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exposed to overly punitive judgments facilitated by state courts. The 
valuation of these cases thus presents a crucial area of interpretation in 
the realm of injunctive relief class actions, as explored in the next Part. 
III.  THE EITHER VIEWPOINT APPROACH’S SUPERIORITY 
This Part demonstrates that the Either Viewpoint approach best 
aligns with CAFA’s intent to broaden federal jurisdiction over class 
actions. Section A explains how CAFA’s text, legislative history, and 
underlying policy concerns favor the Either Viewpoint approach. 
Section B addresses potential reasons why federal courts have 
continued to use the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach in CAFA cases, 
despite CAFA’s significant departure from prior class action 
precedent. Section C advocates for a congressional amendment 
enacting the Either Viewpoint approach to ensure uniform national 
application. 
A. CAFA’s Text, Legislative History, and Underlying Policy 
Concerns Support the Either Viewpoint Approach 
CAFA constituted a significant change from previous standards 
for federal jurisdiction over class actions. Because CAFA explicitly 
permits aggregating plaintiffs’ claims, at least one rationale against the 
Either Viewpoint approach has been eliminated. Additionally, CAFA 
broadly expands defendants’ options for removal to federal court by 
removing the primary pre-CAFA obstacles to federal diversity 
jurisdiction.148 The SeaWorld case is instructive in this context. If 
interpreting the amount in controversy in SeaWorld with the Plaintiff’s 
Viewpoint approach “would frustrate Congress’ manifest purpose”149 
by keeping this large-scale class action out of federal court, the 
Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach should be rejected. 
CAFA’s legislative history offers insight into Congress’s intention 
for courts’ interpretation of the amount in controversy in injunctive 
relief CAFA cases. A Senate Committee on the Judiciary Report 
explicitly advocates for the Either Viewpoint approach: 
The Committee is aware that some courts, especially in the class 
action context, have declined to exercise federal jurisdiction over 
cases on the ground that the amount in controversy in those cases 
 
 148. Supra Part II.A. 
 149. United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 427 (2009). 
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exceeded the jurisdictional threshold only when assessed from the 
viewpoint of the defendant. . . . Because [§ 1332(d)(6)] explicitly 
allows aggregation for purposes of determining the amount in 
controversy in class actions, that concern is no longer relevant.150  
Courts that have applied the Either Viewpoint approach to CAFA 
cases frequently cite this section to support their interpretation.151 
While the Report seems to explicitly resolve any doubt about 
Congress’s intention, courts clinging to the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint 
approach either ignore the Report entirely152 or deny its 
persuasiveness.153 The Report was not issued until ten days after CAFA 
was signed into law, which one court used to discredit its validity as a 
post hoc statement entitled to little persuasive weight.154  
However, these arguments ignore the supporting text in CAFA 
itself: “In any class action, the claims of the individual class members 
shall be aggregated to determine whether the matter in controversy 
exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000.”155 Pre-CAFA circuit decisions 
endorsing the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint rely on Snyder’s prohibition on 
claim aggregation as precluding the Either Viewpoint approach.156 The 
 
 150. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 42–43 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 40–41. 
 151. E.g., Rippee v. Bos. Mkt. Corp., 408 F. Supp. 2d 982, 984 (S.D. Cal. 2005); Otay 
Hydraulics, Inc. v. Safety-Kleen Sys., Inc., No. 2:12-cv-073570DW(VBKx), 2013 WL 1898573, at 
*2 (C.D. Cal. May 6, 2013); Valdez v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 867 F. Supp. 2d 1143, 1163–
64 (D.N.M. 2012); Yeroushalmi v. Blockbuster Inc., No. CV-05-225-AHM(RCX), 2005 WL 
2083008, at *5 (C.D. Cal. July 11, 2005). 
 152. See, e.g., Campos v. Metabolic Rsch., Inc., No. CV 09-9445-VBF(DTBx), 2010 WL 
11597627, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2010) (failing to mention the Report when dismissing the use 
of the “defendant’s-viewpoint approach”).  
 153. See, e.g., Waters v. Ferrara Candy Co., No. 4:17-cv-00197-NCC, 2017 WL 2618271, at *5 
(E.D. Mo. June 16, 2017) (arguing against the persuasive value of the Judiciary Committee CAFA 
report in enforcing the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach), aff’d, 873 F.3d 633 (8th Cir. 2017). 
 154. Id. 
 155. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(6). 
 156. For example, the Ninth Circuit explained,  
[The] defendant’s-viewpoint approach could not be applied to class actions without 
undermining Snyder . . . , in which the Supreme Court had held that class action 
plaintiffs cannot aggregate the amounts of their “separate and distinct” claims in order 
to meet the amount-in-controversy requirement. We explained that in class actions, use 
of the defendant’s-viewpoint approach was “basically the same as aggregation.”  
Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 265 F.3d 853, 859 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted); see Snow v. 
Ford Motor Co., 561 F.2d 787, 790 (9th Cir. 1977) (“[I]n cases which involve ‘separate and distinct 
claims that cannot be aggregated, it would be improper to look to total detriment. The doctrine 
of [Snyder] cannot be so easily evaded.’” (quoting Lonnquist v. J.C. Penney Co., 421 F.2d 597, 599 
(10th Cir. 1970))); Mass. State Pharm. Ass’n v. Fed. Prescription Serv., Inc., 431 F.2d 130, 132 n.1 
(8th Cir. 1970) (“In light of [Snyder] . . . , we are of the view that the ‘plaintiff’s viewpoint’ rule is 
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Third Circuit states, “[A]llowing the amount in controversy to be 
measured by the defendant’s cost would eviscerate Snyder’s holding 
that the claims of class members may not be aggregated in order to 
meet the jurisdictional threshold.”157 All of these cases were decided 
before CAFA did in fact eviscerate Snyder’s holding by declaring that 
“claims of the individual class members shall be aggregated” to reach 
the amount in controversy.158 With claim aggregation explicitly 
required in CAFA’s text, these courts have effectively lost their single 
rationale in support of the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint. As noted in the 
Committee Report, Snyder’s limitations are simply “no longer 
relevant” in CAFA cases.159  
The same outcome proves true in SeaWorld. The plaintiffs did not 
seek any monetary damages on behalf of the class members; in fact, 
“Plaintiffs clearly sought to plead in a way they thought would ensure 
their case would continue in state court.”160 However, CAFA expressly 
provides that the plaintiffs’ claims against SeaWorld must be 
aggregated to reach the amount in controversy.161 While Snyder would 
have prevented such aggregation,162 under CAFA, SeaWorld can 
aggregate all of the plaintiffs’ claims against it to calculate the value of 
the demanded injunctive relief. The plaintiffs’ proposed remedy would 
impose substantial costs in lost ticket sales and tarnished reputation, 
the value of which exceeds the $5 million threshold.163 Accordingly, 
“Plaintiffs do allege a case worth at least $5 million, giving the Court 
original jurisdiction under CAFA.”164 
Perhaps even more convincingly than CAFA’s text and legislative 
history, CAFA’s underlying policy concerns support adopting the 
Either Viewpoint approach. First, the Either Viewpoint approach 
 
the only valid rule . . . . The holding can only be interpreted as precluding the valuation of the 
amount in controversy from the defendant’s viewpoint.” (citation omitted)). 
 157. Packard v. Provident Nat’l Bank, 994 F.2d 1039, 1050 (3d Cir. 1993) (applying the 
Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach and denying federal diversity jurisdiction). 
 158. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(6). 
 159. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 43 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 41. 
 160. Anderson v. SeaWorld Parks & Ent., Inc., 132 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1169 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
 161. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(6). If the court were to apply the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach to 
SeaWorld, aggregation would provide little benefit—even aggregated, the plaintiffs still claimed 
they would derive no monetary benefit from the injunction. Supra note 4 and accompanying test. 
 162. See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 339 (1969) (holding that the claims of class members 
may not be aggregated in order to meet the jurisdictional threshold). 
 163. SeaWorld, 132 F. Supp. 3d at 1164–65. 
 164. Id. at 1165. 
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protects more defendants from the bias of state courts. If CAFA truly 
meant to protect out-of-state defendants from hostile state courts, 
applying the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach controverts this purpose—
more defendants would be confined to state courts, even when they 
face injunctions costing far greater than $5 million, so long as the 
plaintiffs claim nominal monetary benefit from the injunction. This is 
the exact sort of “gam[ing] the system” that Congress sought to curb.165 
Under the Either Viewpoint approach, defendants facing sufficiently 
expensive judgments (to the tune of $5 million) can avail themselves of 
federal jurisdiction to avoid hostile state courts. Similarly, the Either 
Viewpoint approach better embodies Congress’s desire to give federal 
courts jurisdiction over class actions with a national footprint.166 If 
district courts have the option to deny access to federal court under the 
Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach, CAFA will still not grant federal 
jurisdiction to those claims having a large impact on defendants. In 
effect, its purpose to expand federal diversity jurisdiction167 over 
national class actions would be defeated. 
Finally, the Either Viewpoint approach takes into account the 
value of small claims class actions. Under the Either Viewpoint 
approach, plaintiffs can still aggregate their claims to meet the amount 
in controversy. At the same time, guaranteeing federal jurisdiction to 
qualifying defendants under the Either Viewpoint approach ensures 
that defendants are not over deterred by harsh state court judgments. 
By implementing the Either Viewpoint approach, federal courts 
embody the policy implications inherent in CAFA’s structure and 
promote the fairness and equity rationales undergirding CAFA. 
B. Counterarguments to the Either Viewpoint Approach in CAFA 
Cases 
The question from Part II.B remains—why have some courts 
continued to apply the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach in the face of 
evidence that CAFA cases should be treated differently from other 
class actions? While there is no one answer, three factors may help 
explain these judges’ decisions: CAFA’s textual ambiguity, continued 
incorrect application of pre-CAFA class action precedent, and federal 
judges’ hostility toward CAFA. 
 
 165. Supra note 11 and accompanying text.  
 166. Supra notes 74–77 and accompanying text.  
 167. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.  
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CAFA’s text is frequently critiqued as too ambiguous, and this 
may lead courts to continue to apply the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach 
absent explicit congressional instruction. Ambiguous may be too rosy 
a characterization—scholars deem the drafting “sloppy.”168 In fact, 
substantial litigation has been dedicated to interpreting an unrelated 
provision of CAFA that reads as entirely nonsensical.169 This slip is 
emblematic of CAFA’s sloppy drafting. Although Congress did not 
sloppily describe the aggregation principle, its failure to specify the 
proper viewpoint for analysis permits judicial discretion in applying the 
Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach.170 Judges hostile to CAFA can thereby 
interpret the statute to apply the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach absent 
explicit congressional direction. 
CAFA’s ambiguity also plays into the rationale that courts have 
simply (or perhaps stubbornly) stuck with their pre-CAFA class action 
precedent. However, few circuit courts have had occasion to rule on 
the issue—instead, district courts have issued the majority of decisions. 
Notably, the only district courts that have applied the Plaintiff’s 
Viewpoint approach sit in circuits that applied that approach in pre-
CAFA cases.171 The trend of following pre-CAFA precedent seems to 
follow in other areas of CAFA interpretation as well.  
For example, in the context of removal, CAFA remains silent on 
the burden of proof required to show that plaintiffs did or did not meet 
the amount-in-controversy requirement. Absent congressional 
guidance on which standard to use, courts almost uniformly applied 
 
 168. E.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, CAFA Judicata: A Tale of Waste and 
Politics, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1565 (2008); Jacob R. Karabell, The Implementation of 
“Balanced Diversity” Through the Class Action Fairness Act, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 300, 305 n.27 
(2009).  
 169. Adam N. Steinman, “Less” Is “More”? Textualism, Intentionalism, and a Better Solution 
to the Class Action Fairness Act’s Appellate Deadline Riddle, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1183, 1183 (2007). 
In this provision, CAFA gives courts of appeals discretionary jurisdiction over district court 
decisions on whether removal under CAFA is appropriate, but only in cases where “application 
is made to the court of appeals not less than 7 days after entry of the order.” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1453(c)(1). If the statute is supposed to grant appeals only where a timely appeal is filed, 
legislative history and common sense indicate that Congress intended to write “not more than 7 
days.” Steinman, supra, at 1187.  
 170. See, e.g., Waters v. Ferrara Candy Co., No. 4:17-cv-00197-NCC, 2017 WL 2618271, at *6 
(E.D. Mo. June 16, 2017) (applying the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach despite acknowledging 
CAFA’s disposal of the anti-aggregation principle and the Senate Report’s explicit instruction to 
use the Either Viewpoint approach), aff’d, 873 F.3d 633 (8th Cir. 2017). 
 171. Supra Part II.C. 
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their pre-CAFA class action precedent.172 As in SeaWorld, courts in the 
Ninth Circuit have demonstrated willingness to treat CAFA cases 
differently from class actions not brought under CAFA.173 However, 
the remaining courts’ unwillingness to apply a different standard from 
pre-CAFA class actions may explain why some courts continue to 
apply the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach absent additional 
congressional direction. 
Finally, some scholars have suggested that federal judges are 
generally hostile to CAFA.174 This would explain why judges continue 
to apply the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach—as the narrower standard, 
it inherently favors state court jurisdiction and limits defendants’ 
options to remove to federal court. The suggestion that federal judges 
are hostile to CAFA may have some bite, perhaps most notably in the 
face of evidence that judges were reluctant to accept an increase to 
their already heavy dockets.175 The day before CAFA was passed, 
Congressman William Delahunt urged his fellow Representatives to 
consider that “[t]he practical effect of [the bill] could be that many 
cases will never be heard given how overburdened Federal judges 
are.”176 Studies from the Federal Judicial Center suggest that these 
concerns were well-founded: in the four months following CAFA’s 
passage, the number of class action suits in the three federal district 
courts the Center observed increased significantly.177 
Professors Kevin Clermont and Theodore Eisenberg’s research 
proves particularly illuminating. In an empirical analysis of federal 
CAFA decisions from 2005 through 2008, Clermont and Eisenberg 
conclude that “[t]he set of all published opinions to date allows us to 
 
 172. Compare Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1208–11 (11th Cir. 2007) (applying 
the precedent of the preponderance standard); Smith v. Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 505 
F.3d 401, 404–05 (6th Cir. 2007) (same); Blockbuster, Inc. v. Galeno, 472 F.3d 53, 58 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(same); Preston v. Tenet Healthsystem Mem’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 485 F.3d 804, 813–14 (5th Cir. 2007) 
(same), with Morgan v. Gay, 471 F.3d 469, 474 (3d Cir. 2006) (applying the pre-CAFA precedent 
of the legal certainty standard). 
 173. See, e.g., Pagel v. Dairy Farmers of Am., Inc., 986 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1159 (C.D. Cal. 2013) 
(ruling that the circuit’s pre-CAFA precedent did not require “that the ‘either viewpoint’ rule is 
prohibited in CAFA cases”). 
 174. Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 168, at 1591. 
 175. See 149 CONG. REC. 25,209 (2003) (statement of the Judicial Conference of the United 
States) (expressing its “concerns that the provisions would add substantially to the workload of 
the Federal courts”). 
 176. 151 CONG. REC. 2643 (2005) (statement of Rep. William Delahunt). 
 177. Memorandum from Tom Willging & Emery Lee, supra note 102.  
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conclude that most federal judges have resisted CAFA.”178 Specifically, 
they find that federal courts had noticeably high rulings in favor of 
plaintiffs’ motions to remand in both the district courts179 and courts of 
appeals.180 They also find that when defendants acted as appellants in 
CAFA cases, judges had a significantly higher reversal rate of 37 
percent.181 Clermont and Eisenberg find that this statistic “tends to 
show that it is opposition to extension of CAFA, rather than any 
aberrational pro-plaintiff attitude, that is driving the appellate 
judges.”182 Though this Note does not attempt to recreate that data 
with more modern cases, more recent legislative history suggesting 
CAFA amendments show that this concern is ongoing.183 This 
noticeable hostility to extending CAFA jurisdiction to defendants 
provides a compelling backdrop to courts’ unwillingness to apply the 
Either Viewpoint approach in CAFA cases. 
In short, CAFA’s textual ambiguity regarding which Viewpoint 
judges should use to value the amount in controversy leaves the door 
open for them to continue using the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach. 
Some judges may be motivated by precedent, simply applying the 
Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach if precedent so dictates. Other judges 
might be driven by less innocent motives. If a federal judge is already 
hostile to CAFA, its textual ambiguity allows them to remand cases 
back to state court. These rationales provide further ammunition to an 
argument in favor of more federal intervention in the form of a 
congressional amendment.  
 
 178. Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 168, at 1591.  
 179. Clermont and Eisenberg found a two-to-one plaintiff win rate in federal district courts. 
Id. at 1579. 
 180. A slightly lower, but still noticeably high, plaintiff win rate of 57 percent was found in 
courts of appeals. Id. at 1582. 
 181. Id. at 1583. 
 182. Id. at 1584. 
 183. See Class Actions Seven Years After the Class Action Fairness Act: Hearing Before the H. 
Subcomm. on the Const., 112th Cong. 38 (2012) (statement of Rep. Jerrold Nadler) (“[W]e 
expressed the concern that [CAFA] would increase the workload of our already overburdened 
courts . . . . And growing caseloads leave Federal judges even less time.”); State of Class Actions 
Ten Years After the Enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. 
on the Const. & Civ. Just., 114th Cong. 35 (2015) (statement of Rep. John Conyers) (“[T]he Act 
will increase the workload of our already overburdened Federal courts . . . .”). Despite this 
concern, no official amendments to CAFA have been proposed or drafted.  
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C. Necessity of a Congressional Amendment to Enforce the Either 
Viewpoint Approach 
The prior Sections have focused on the whys: why CAFA 
necessitates the use of the Either Viewpoint approach and why some 
courts have continued to apply the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach in 
the face of that evidence. This Section will focus on the how. More 
specifically, this Section will demonstrate the need for a congressional 
amendment of CAFA to enforce the Either Viewpoint approach. This 
need stems from the three explanations described above for judges’ 
continued use of the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach: CAFA’s textual 
ambiguity, misapplied pre-CAFA precedent, and hostility to CAFA 
cases generally.184 
The amendment would be best situated within 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(d)(6), the provision that presently authorizes claim 
aggregation.185 Claim aggregation is one of the necessary conditions for 
the Either Viewpoint approach, and the provision already states the $5 
million amount-in-controversy requirement. Therefore, the 
amendment could be appended to the existing text. An adapted version 
of the Tenth Circuit’s explanation of the Either Viewpoint approach 
provides a useful structure.186 Additionally, adapting the language of 
existing precedent on the Either Viewpoint approach directs federal 
courts that have previously used the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach to 
look toward circuits that have already applied the Either Viewpoint 
approach for guidance. As combined with the existing text, the 
amended text of § 1332(d)(6) would read, 
In any class action, the claims of the individual class members shall be 
aggregated to determine whether the matter in controversy exceeds 
the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs. The 
courts shall consider the greater of either the aggregated value to the 
plaintiff or the cost to the defendant of injunctive relief as the measure 
of the amount in controversy.187 
This amendment would effectively address each of the three 
rationales for continuing to apply the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach. 
First, amending the statute’s language would give explicit guidance to 
 
 184. See supra Part III.B. 
 185. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(6) (“In any class action, the claims of the individual class 
members shall be aggregated to determine whether the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or 
value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs.”). 
 186. Supra note 117 and accompanying text.  
 187. The added portion is italicized.  
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courts on how to value the amount in controversy in these cases. 
Second, statutory language describing how CAFA cases should be 
treated differently from non-CAFA class actions would demonstrate 
why prior precedent should not be followed. Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly, explicitly requiring the Either Viewpoint approach in 
these cases would deny judges the discretion to oppose extending 
CAFA jurisdiction to defendants.  
The existing pool of precedent interpreting CAFA demonstrates 
a muddled and confusing application of CAFA to injunctive relief 
cases.188 While some courts have looked to CAFA’s legislative history 
in applying the Either Viewpoint approach, others have disregarded 
this history as unpersuasive or ignored it altogether.189 Providing 
concrete guidance on the proper interpretation within the text of the 
statute itself could help avoid this confusion. Because CAFA’s text, 
legislative history, and underlying policy concerns demand that courts 
use the Either Viewpoint approach, the most efficient and binding way 
to implement it nationwide is to include the Either Viewpoint in the 
text of CAFA itself. 
CONCLUSION 
CAFA demonstrates a significant departure from prior 
procedural requirements for removing class actions to federal court. 
Whether based on concerns for state courts’ bias against out-of-state 
defendants or the national impacts of such litigation, the underlying 
principle of expansive federal jurisdiction remains clear. CAFA’s text, 
legislative history, and underlying policy concerns all show that 
Congress intended to increase opportunities for defendants to remove 
to federal court. The Either Viewpoint approach acknowledges the 
value of the suit to the same party Congress sought to protect in 
enacting CAFA: the defendant. However, district courts have 
perpetuated an obstacle to federal jurisdiction by continuing to apply 
the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach in CAFA cases. Courts may be 
motivated by CAFA’s ambiguity, a desire to comport with their 
 
 188. Supra Part II.C. 
 189. See, e.g., Waters v. Ferrara Candy Co., No. 4:17-cv-00197-NCC, 2017 WL 2618271, at *5 
(E.D. Mo. June 16, 2017) (arguing against persuasive value of the Judiciary Committee’s CAFA 
report in enforcing the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach), aff’d, 873 F.3d 633 (8th Cir. 2017); Parker 
v. Riggio, No. 10 Civ. 9504(LLS), 2012 WL 3240837, at *7–9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2012) (following 
the Plaintiff’s Viewpoint approach based on Second Circuit precedent without considering 
CAFA’s legislative history). 
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previous non-CAFA precedent, or even outright hostility to CAFA. 
Regardless of the motivation, the result remains the same—courts have 
created a hodgepodge application of CAFA to amount-in-controversy 
valuation that leaves defendants with unpredictable expectations in 
injunctive relief cases. 
The most effective resolution of this confusion would be achieved 
through a congressional amendment to ensure uniform nationwide 
application. In the meantime, defendants in injunctive relief cases 
remain subject to the will of district court judges in deciding which 
viewpoint will be used to value their claims. As in the SeaWorld case, 
these determinations may make or break a defendant’s opportunity for 
federal removal. The current doctrine leaves too much discretion to 
federal judges to answer one of the most important questions to a 
defendant in an injunctive relief class action.  
 
